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Emerging Privacy Torts in Canada and New Zealand: 
An English Perspective 
 
Thomas D C Bennett* 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Establishing legal protections for privacy interests has long been a controversial endeavour. 
In recent years, it has become more so, particularly in common law jurisdictions where it falls 
to judges to undertake this endeavour. The passing of the Human Rights Act 1998, which 
incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into English law, spurred 
English courts to adapt the common law in order to protect informational privacy interests 
(under Article 8).1 The doctrinal developments flowing from this adaptation have attracted 
the attention of courts across the common law world.2 Scrutiny of two recent developments, 
however, in Canada and New Zealand, indicates that whilst the English jurisprudence has 
received judicial attention abroad, it has not provided a basis upon which other jurisdictions 
have been inclined to develop their own privacy laws. In particular, English common law’s 
(virtually exclusive) focus on the informational aspects of privacy preclude it providing much 
in the way of guidance for judges concerned to advance protection for other privacy interests 
(such as “intrusion upon seclusion”). For whilst there has been growing public and judicial 
awareness of the importance of personal privacy, the notion of developing a privacy tort of 
general application has remained seemingly unpalatable across much of the common law 
world until very recently.3 
 
In the last two years, new privacy torts for “intrusion upon seclusion” have been recognised 
in Canada and New Zealand for the first time. In January 2012, the Court of Appeal for the 
Canadian province of Ontario recognised such a tort in Jones v Tsige.4 In August 2012, the 
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1 Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] UKHL 22; [2004] 2 AC 457. See also Vidal Hall and Ors v 
Google Inc [2014] EWHC 13 (QB) in which Tugendhat J identifies the cause of action developed in Campbell 
(known as “misuse of private information”) as tortious rather than equitable (at [70]). Until Vidal Hall, English 
courts had been equivocal on whether the basis of misuse of private information was tortious or equitable. 
2 See, for example, the Australian High Court’s decision in Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd v Australian 
Broadcasting Corp [2001] HCA 63; (2001) 185 ALR 1 and the New Zealand Court of Appeal’s decision in 
Hosking v Runting [2004] NZCA 34; [2005] 1 NZLR 1. 
3 The USA has long had four common law privacy torts including an “intrusion upon seclusion” tort (see the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977, §652); also W Prosser, “Privacy” (1960) 48 Cal L Rev 383 at 389) but this 
model has – until recently – been avoided by Commonwealth countries. See, for example, Lenah and Hosking, 
ibid. Opportunities to recognise privacy torts of general application (as opposed to those which respond only to 
a discrete aspect of privacy, such as the publication of private information) have consistently been rejected by 
the English courts (see Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62 at 66; Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53; 
[2004] 2 AC 406 at [18-19]; Campbell, n.1, above, at [133]).  
4 2012 ONCA 32 (hereafter “Jones”). For a more detailed analysis of the decision in the context of private law 
judicial method, see TDC Bennett, “Privacy, Corrective Justice and Incrementalism: Legal Imagination and the 
Recognition of a Privacy Tort in Ontario” (2013) 59:1 McGill Law Journal (forthcoming). 
New Zealand High Court followed suit, recognising a very similar tort in C v Holland.5 
These two cases share substantial similarities. Both represent sizeable and controversial steps 
forward for the protection of privacy interests in their respective jurisdictions. Moreover, both 
purport to develop tort law on a merely incremental basis – both judgments deny 
overstepping the boundaries of the court’s legitimate role and usurping the function of the 
legislature.6 They both also contrast sharply with the state of English privacy law, which has 
developed more slowly and along different, confidence-based lines.7  
 
Both Jones and Holland arise out of particularly “shocking”,8 although quite different, 
violations of the plaintiffs’ privacy by way of intrusions into the private sphere. Both cases 
respond to these violations with the strongest judicial action possible – the recognition of new 
heads of liability to provide redress. Both also feature the same justificatory factors 
expounded by the respective judges: both (by implication) draw on an ideal of “corrective 
justice” (a key component of tort law9), and on the “value” of privacy (which we might 
describe as a “significant interest” deserving of the protection of tort law10). Also highly 
significantly, both cases exhibit an express sensitivity to the countervailing interest most 
often cited as a reason against expanding privacy protections: freedom of expression. Both 
judges are at some pains (particularly in Holland) to assuage concerns about the impact of the 
decisions on free speech. 
 
This essay will first set out and contextualise the decisions in Jones and Holland, and the 
formulation of the newly recognised torts. We will then be in a position to draw some 
comparisons with the “other” way of doing things – the English confidence-based approach 
to privacy protection. 
 
Jones and Holland 
 
The case of Jones concerned a plaintiff whose banking records had been surreptitiously 
accessed by the defendant 174 times over a four-year period. Both parties were employees of 
the bank at which the plaintiff held the account that the defendant accessed. The accessing 
began when the defendant entered into a relationship with the plaintiff’s former husband. The 
defendant accessed the plaintiff’s accounts to obtain knowledge as to the plaintiff’s financial 
information.11 However, the defendant did not put the information gleaned to any particular 
                                                          
5 [2012] NZHC 2155 (hereafter “Holland”). 
6 See Jones, n.4, above, at [49] and [54]; Holland, n.5, above, at [88]. 
7 “Confidence-based” means, in this context, that the law relating to privacy expounded in the common law of 
England in the last decade has its roots in the older, equitable doctrine of confidence (although it has now been 
judicially recognised as having morphed into a tort – see n.1, above). This is returned to in the section: “A 
contrast with England”, below. 
8 Jones, n.4, above, at [69]. 
9 See, inter alia, E Weinrib, “The Special Morality of Tort Law” (1989) 34:3 McGill LJ 403; S Perry, “The 
Moral Foundations of Tort Law” (1992) 77(2) Iowa L Rev 449. 
10 L Dolding and R Mullender, “Tort Law, Incrementalism, and the House of Lords” (1996) 47(1) NILQ 12 at 
12. 
11 “Tsige … maintains in this action[] that she was involved in a financial dispute with [Jones’] former husband 
and accessed the accounts to confirm whether he was paying child support to [Jones]. Jones does not accept that 
use. At no point was the information disseminated more widely. The plaintiff brought an 
action for invasion of privacy that was dismissed at first instance when the motions judge 
held that Ontario law contained no such cause of action.12  
 
The case of Holland concerned a plaintiff who had been the victim of covert video-taping by 
the defendant whilst she had been showering. The defendant had recorded the plaintiff in 
states of partial and complete undress on two occasions and had transferred the recordings to 
his personal computer’s hard disk. Upon discovering the existence of the videos, the plaintiff 
brought an action for invasion of privacy. In the New Zealand High Court, the defendant 
agreed that he had, as a matter of fact, invaded the plaintiff’s privacy, but averred that no 
cause of action existed in tort which provided relief.  
 
In both cases, novel torts were recognised: on appeal in Jones and at first instance in Holland. 
The torts recognised are both broadly similar to, and seemingly take their lead from, the 
USA’s “intrusion upon seclusion” tort identified in the Second Restatement of Torts.13 
 
The domestic legal background to both cases is remarkably similar. In both jurisdictions there 
was scant authority for the recognition of an intrusion-type privacy tort. In Jones, however, 
Sharpe JA pointed out that: 
 
[whilst] [i]n Canada, there has been no definitive statement from an appellate court on 
the issue of whether there is a common law right of action corresponding to the 
intrusion on seclusion category[,] ... where the courts did not accept the existence of a 
privacy tort, they rarely went so far as to rule out the potential of such a tort.14  
 
In Holland, Whata J was faced with a situation where “[t]here [was] no existing authority in 
New Zealand for the proposition that an intrusion upon an individual’s seclusion … [gave] 
rise to an actionable tort”.15 In fact, New Zealand case law had, in terms reminiscent of the 
House of Lords in Wainwright v Secretary of State,16 expressly rejected the possibility of a 
general tort of privacy in Hosking v Runting, when constructing a tort aimed solely at 
guarding against the publication of private facts.17 (Albeit the court in Hosking had not 
expressly ruled out the possibility of recognising, at some point in the future, further discrete 
privacy torts.18) As such, in both cases, the judges involved could not provide a tortious 
remedy to the plaintiffs without making significant developments in the common law.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
explanation as she ways it is inconsistent with the timing and frequency of Tsige’s snooping” (Jones, n.4, above, 
at [5]). 
12 2011 ONSC 1475. 
13 Restatement, n.3, above. 
14 Jones n.4, above, at [25] and [31]. 
15 Holland, n.5, above, at [8]. 
16 Wainwright, n.3, above. 
17 [2004] NZCA 34; [2005] 1 NZLR 1. 
18 Ibid at [118]. 
The formulation of the torts ultimately recognised in both cases is remarkably similar. In 
Jones, Sharpe JA (giving the lead judgment, with which Winkler CJ and Cunningham J (ad 
hoc) agreed) formulated the new privacy tort in the following terms: 
 
[F]irst ... the defendant’s conduct must be intentional, within which I would include 
reckless; second, ... the defendant must have invaded, without lawful justification, the 
plaintiff’s private affairs or concerns; and third, ... a reasonable person would regard 
the invasion as highly offensive causing distress, humiliation or anguish.19 
 
In Jones, Sharpe JA was clearly moved by the “deliberate, prolonged and shocking” actions 
of the defendant. He remarked that Ontario law “would be sadly deficient if we were required 
to send Jones away without a legal remedy”.20 Moreover, he focused on the harm that the 
plaintiff suffered and the cause of that harm (i.e. the defendant’s wrongful conduct). This led 
him to award Jones C$10,000 in damages. Sharpe JA was also particularly concerned by the 
threats to privacy posed by “the internet and digital technology”.21 We might surmise that he 
was motivated to engage in this development of an apparently deficient common law by a 
commitment to the pursuit of corrective justice.22 
 
In Holland, Whata J, explaining that “the most appropriate course is to maintain as much 
consistency as possible with the North American tort”, formulated the New Zealand intrusion 
action in very similar terms: 
 
[I]n order to establish a claim based on the tort of intrusion upon seclusion a plaintiff 
must show: 
 (a) An intentional and unauthorised intrusion; 
 (b) Into seclusion (namely intimate personal activity, space or affairs); 
 (c) Involving infringement of a reasonable expectation of privacy; 
 (d) That is highly offensive to a reasonable person.23 
 
Whata J cited Jones several times in his judgment. He was clearly of the view that Ontario’s 
new intrusion tort was formulated virtually identically to the United States’ one (hence his 
assertion that there is, in essence, a single “North American” model for such torts).24 He was 
similarly concerned by threats to privacy which are “increasing with technological 
advances”.25 He also expressed a concern – doubtless familiar to those judges who take 
cognisance of relevant overseas authority whilst engaging in significant common law 
                                                          
19 Jones, n.4, above, at [71]. 
20 Ibid at [69]. 
21 Ibid at [67]. See also S Warren and L Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy” (1890) 4 Harv L Rev 193. 
22 On this assertion, see Bennett, n.4, above. Corrective justice, broadly speaking, is an ideal which demands 
that wrongdoers (those who are culpable) are required to compensate those to whom their wrongdoing occasions 
harm. As such, it is often (though not universally) considered a key principle underpinning tort law. On 
corrective justice generally, see E Weinrib, “Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law” (1988) 97 
Yale LJ 949 and S Perry, “The Moral Foundations of Tort Law” (1991-2) 77 Iowa L Rev 441.  
23 Holland, n.5, above, at [94]. 
24 Ibid.  
25 Ibid at [86]. 
development – that citizens of his jurisdiction (New Zealand) ought not to “be afforded 
[lesser protection than Ontarians] from unwanted intrusions”.26 
 
Another noteworthy theme in Whata J’s judgment is the “value” of privacy.27 He described 
privacy as having “value” (or being a “value” recognised within domestic or foreign law) no 
less than 27 times in his judgment. He linked the “value” of privacy to “the protection of 
personal autonomy”.28 In so doing, he enjoys a wide range of judicial and academic support, 
not least from Sharpe JA.29 
 
Given the value placed by both Sharpe JA and Whata J on privacy, there are reasons to 
conclude that both judgments are primarily informed by deontological impulses. Both judges 
are, however, alive to the potential for conflict between privacy rights and other interests such 
as free speech considerations.30 Moreover, this is reflected in the adoption (in both instances) 
of the “highly offensive to a reasonable person” threshold for liability (which can be traced 
back to the United States’ First Amendment-sensitive version of the tort31). The prima facie 
deontological focus of the torts is, then, clearly qualified by some powerful, consequentialist 
concerns.32  
 
Finally in this section, it is worth considering the impact which both Jones and Holland have 
for the maintenance of legal certainty. Both torts are novel, and thus might be said to have in 
essence imposed liability retrospectively on the defendants involved. However, we have 
reason to suggest that taking the step of recognising these torts actually advanced the cause of 
legal certainty in these jurisdictions. For, having modelled the novel torts closely on the US 
intrusion tort, both Canada and New Zealand will be able to draw on a rich volume of case 
law from the United States as to the torts’ application.33 The torts recognised in each case are, 
essentially, complete – they are unlikely to require substantial further refinement.34 The only 
parties who have suffered from a brief lack of certainty in these jurisdictions are the two 
defendants themselves. Yet each admitted their wrongdoing and, in any event, can have been 
in little doubt whilst committing their respective privacy-invading acts that they were 
engaging in wrongful behaviour, in the sense that they caused anguish and distress to the 
plaintiffs and failed to respect their reasonable expectations of privacy.35 Below, we will 
                                                          
26 Ibid at [87]. 
27 Unfortunately, the question of damages was reserved in Holland and the amount ultimately awarded has not 
been made public. 
28 Ibid at [86]. 
29 See Jones, n.4, above, at [66-7]. See also Griswold v Connecticut 381 US 479 (1965); E Bloustein, “Privacy 
as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser” (1964) 39 New York University Law Review 962, 
971 and S Benn, “Privacy, Freedom and Respect for Persons”, in J Roland Pennock & JW Chapman eds, Nomos 
XIII: Privacy 2 (New York: Atherton, 1971). 
30 See Jones, n.4, above, at [53]; Holland, n.5, above, at [97]. 
31 See Prosser, n.3 above. 
32 On the argument that tort law is informed by a moral principle identified as “qualified deontology” see R 
Mullender, “Tort, Human Rights and Common Law Culture” (2003) 23(2) OJLS 301 at 308. 
33 See Prosser, n.3, above, at 389-392. 
34 C.f. “A contrast with England”, below. 
35 In other words, the acts of the defendants caused harm to the plaintiff’s “significant interests”. See Dolding 
and Mullender, n.10, above, at 12. 
contrast the legal certainty promoted by these two torts with the uncertainty that English 
law’s more narrowly drawn informational tort has engendered in recent years. 
 
A contrast with England 
 
In England, privacy interests have long been accorded some protection by a rather 
bewildering assortment of legal mechanisms, as opposed to a single cause (or even a small 
number of discrete causes) cause of action.36 The extent to which this assortment of 
mechanisms is comprehensive in its protection of privacy interests remains debatable.37 
Certainly, in contrast to Ontario and New Zealand, judges in English cases have resolutely 
refused to start afresh by formulating a broad, generally applicable tort of “invasion of 
privacy” (or some such similar moniker).38  
 
Instead, protection for privacy interests in England has been built into (or added onto) these 
existing legal mechanisms – most notably the equitable doctrine of confidence. This 
particular doctrine has “mutat[ed] at an exponential rate”.39 It has generally operated under 
the name “misuse of private information” since Lord Nicholls coined the phrase in Campbell 
v MGN.40 This expanded cause of action provides relief for violations of informational 
privacy in a range of circumstances – including those in which there was no pre-existing 
relationship of confidence between the parties (e.g. Douglas41 and Mosley42).  
 
As such, at present it is not entirely clear what the doctrinal basis of misuse of private 
information is. Despite its equitable roots, it has also been suggested that the doctrine is no 
longer equitable in nature but has become tortious.43 Moosavian, writing in 2012, has argued 
                                                          
36 These mechanisms include, inter alia: data protection legislation, protection from harassment legislation, 
common law actions for trespass to the person and property, nuisance and the equitable doctrine protecting 
confidences. 
37 See R Mullender, “Privacy, Imbalance and the Legal Imagination” (2011) 19(2) Tort L Rev 109, in which 
Mullender suggests that a narrow focus by lawyers and judges on informational privacy has stymied the 
development of legal mechanisms to protect a greater range of privacy-related interests. 
38 See, for example, Wainwright n.3, above, at [19], also Campbell, n.1, above, at [43]. 
39 B Markesinis, “Concerns and Ideas About the Developing English Law of Privacy (And How Knowledge of 
Foreign Law Might Be of Help)” (2004) 52 Am J Comp L 133 at 182. 
40 Campbell, n.1 above, at [14]. It should be noted that the rise of “misuse of private information” has not 
heralded the end of “breach of confidence”. The equitable doctrine of confidence remains actionable in its 
original form. See R Moosavian, “Charting the journey from confidence to the new methodology” (2012) EIPR 
324, and T Aplin, “The Future of Breach of Confidence and the Protection of Privacy” (2007) 7 Oxford 
University Commonwealth LJ 137. 
41 Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 595; [2006] QB 125. In Douglas, the claimants, a celebrity couple, 
sought damages in respect of the publication of photographs taken by an undercover reporter who gained access 
to their wedding. An exclusive agreement had been reached with another magazine (Ok!) for publication of 
official photographs of the wedding. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal held that the event was still one in 
respect of which the claimants had a reasonable expectation of privacy (see [95]). 
42 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB); [2008] EMLR 20. In Mosley, the Formula 
1 racing supremo, Mr Max Mosley, obtained damages for misuse of private information in respect of pictures, 
video footage (online) and accompanying articles of a sexual nature, published by the defendant’s (now defunct) 
tabloid The News of the World. 
43 See H McGregor, McGregor on Damages, 18th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2009) at 1712. 
Alternatively, the view that the cause of action remains equitable finds expression in AM Dugdale, MA Jones & 
M Simpson, eds, Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 19th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) at 1173. 
that there is “slightly stronger” evidence that misuse of private information is tortious, but 
that it retains certain equitable elements.44 Alternatively, it has been posited that it might be a 
“new creature” entirely, developed from the rights-balancing method espoused by the 
European Court of Human Rights.45 One High Court judge has recently considered directly 
the question of the nature of misuse of private information, concluding that it is a tort and not 
an equitable action.46 The attempt to clarify the situation is both long overdue and welcome. 
However, the judgment is only at first instance and on a purely procedural matter and so may 
not be conclusive of the question. The defendant (Google Inc) has also indicated that the 
decision will be appealed. 
 
Whatever the solution to this conundrum, however, it is clear that misuse of private 
information has evolved significantly from its origins as a protector of information confided 
within a particular relationship. Yet the lack of a tort in English law specifically designed to 
deal with intrusion-type scenarios is somewhat anomalous. It certainly has been out of kilter 
with the position in the United States since the Second Restatement. 
 
The uncertainty surrounding misuse of private information that has been engendered by the 
confusion as to its doctrinal roots is compounded by a further issue. In terms of methodology, 
there has been a lack of clarity in recent years as to what precisely the elements of misuse of 
private information are. Some commentators proffer the view that it involves two elements,47 
these being those identified by Eady J in the Mosley case: 
 
If the first hurdle can be overcome, by demonstrating a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, … the court is required to carry out the next step of weighing the relevant 
competing … rights [of the parties] in the light of an “intense focus” upon the 
individual facts of the case.48 
 
This two-element approach, however, is silent on the need for a “misuse” of the information. 
This is strange, since – especially if the cause of action is now tortious – the law would seem 
to say nothing about the wrongful act for which the doctrine provides relief. This silence 
results in a worrying lack of clarity: what conduct exactly will attract liability for the 
defendant? It may well be that the reason why the “misuse” stage of the method has failed to 
be significantly elaborated upon is that, in general, in the cases which have come before the 
English courts, the “misuse” has been very obvious. The vast majority of such cases have 
involved publication of private information, often about celebrity claimants, by the media.49 
The objectionable conduct is clear in these cases: it is the act of publishing the information. 
                                                          
44 Moosavian, n.37, above, at 327. 
45 Eady J, “Protecting Freedom of Expression in the Context of the European Convention of Human Rights” 
(unpublished), a public lecture given at City University, London, 10th March 2010. The transcript is available 
at: http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Speeches/eady-j-city-university-10032010.pdf.  
46 See Vidal Hall, n.1, above. 
47 See Moosavian, n.37, above at 330; also R Wacks, Privacy and Media Freedom (Oxford: OUP, 2013) 114. 
48 Mosley, n.39, above, at [10]. 
49 See, for example: Campbell, n.1, above; Mosley, ibid; McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2007] 3 
WLR 194; Murray v Express Newspapers [2008] EWCA Civ 446, [2009] Ch 481. 
 
Breaking down the methodology into three elements (separating the reasonable expectation 
question from the misuse question) would have significant advantages for clarity.50 It would 
thus be more accurate to say that there must be information about which the claimant has a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” and some sort of “misuse” of that information by the 
defendant. Once both of those elements are made out, then the court will consider the only 
applicable defence: publication in the public interest based on a Strasbourg-inspired test of 
proportionality. 
 
However, most recently there have been signs that there is not necessarily any need for 
publication in order to trigger liability under misuse of private information. The mere 
acquisition of private material may be sufficient to trigger liability under this doctrine. The 
Court of Appeal first pronounced misuse of private information (or “breach of confidence”) 
capable of providing relief in the absence of a “misuse” of the information in Imerman v 
Tchenguiz.51 Imerman involved the unlawful accessing and copying of confidential computer 
files. The Court of Appeal stated that:  
 
If confidence applies to a defendant who adventitiously, but without authorisation, 
obtains information in respect of which he must have appreciated that the claimant 
had an expectation of privacy, it must, a fortiori, extend to a defendant who 
intentionally, and without authorisation, takes steps to obtain such information. … 
[I]ntentionally obtaining such information, secretly and knowing that the claimant 
reasonably expects it to be private, is itself a breach of confidence.52 
 
[I]t would be a breach of confidence for a defendant, without the authority of the 
claimant, to examine, or to make, retain, or supply copies to a third party of, a 
document whose contents are, and were (or ought to have been) appreciated by the 
defendant to be, confidential ….53 
 
The Court of Appeal observed that simply because the cause of action has come to be known 
by the name “misuse of private information”,54 it “does not mean that there has to be such 
misuse before a claim for breach of confidentiality can succeed”.55 But this leaves open the 
question of what exactly needs to be proven in lieu of “misuse”. Here, the Court of Appeal 
                                                          
50 The author first argued in favour of understanding “misuse of private information” as comprising three 
distinct elements in TDC Bennett, “Corrective Justice and Horizontal Privacy: A Leaf out of Wright J’s Book” 
(2010) 7 J Juris 545 at 555. 
51 See Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908; [2011] Fam 116 at [68-9]. Imerman was an interlocutory 
appeal in ancillary relief proceedings. Tchenguiz was divorcing Imerman. Keen to prevent Imerman concealing 
any of his assets from the court, Tchenguiz’s brother accessed Imerman’s computer files at his (Imerman’s) 
place of work without his knowledge, and downloaded a substantial quantity of these files to be passed to 
Tchenguiz’s solicitors. The Court of Appeal held that the act of obtaining the information could constitute a 
breach of confidence, even in the absence of any wider dissemination of it.  See also CTB v NGN Ltd [2011] 
EWHC 1326 (QB) at [23]; and Goodwin v NGN Ltd [2011] EWHC 1437 (QB); [2011] EMLR 27 at [85]. 
52 Imerman, ibid, at [68]. 
53 Ibid at [69]. 
54 Ibid at [65]. 
55 Ibid at [71]. 
could have spoken with greater precision. The real question was not whether a misuse of the 
information is required, but what act constitutes such a misuse at law. In Imerman, the Court 
decided that, in surreptitiously obtaining confidential information, the defendant acted in a 
manner which was essentially inequitable. Thus, since equitable concepts originally 
underpinned the breach of confidence doctrine from which misuse of private information has 
emerged (whatever its current classification – equitable, tortious or otherwise), the 
defendant’s conduct could properly be regarded as wrongful. 
 
The Court of Appeal, in Imerman, perhaps sought to plug a gap in protection for privacy 
rights, thereby bringing English privacy law closer to the more developed US scheme. The 
Court’s reasoning was, essentially, this: since the defendant knew that the information he was 
seeking to obtain was confidential/private, and since he needed to act surreptitiously in order 
to obtain it, the act was wrongful as it robbed the claimant of the ability to control who had 
access to the information. 
 
In another recent privacy decision (concerning interim injunctive relief), CTB v NGN, Eady J 
pronounced that “[i]t is important always to remember that the modern law of privacy is not 
concerned solely with information or ‘secrets’: it is also concerned importantly with 
intrusion”.56 This echoed comments from the same judge in Mosley, that “the very fact of 
clandestine recording may be regarded as an intrusion”.57 Indeed, in Mosley, Eady J uses the 
term “intrusion” sixteen times in relation to the violation of the claimant’s privacy. At this 
point in my analysis, it might be objected that I overstate the significance of Eady J’s use of 
the term “intrusion”; that he may simply be using it as a synonym for “violation” or “breach” 
of privacy. However, there is evidence that Eady J does attach normative significance to this 
particular term. For despite the fact that Mosley was pleaded on the basis that the wrongful 
act of the defendant was the publication of private information, Eady J’s frequent and 
consistent use of the term “intrusion” suggests a greater concern with the nature of the 
defendant’s conduct. Moreover, he defends this concern, stating: “obviously the nature and 
scale of the distress caused [by publication] is in large measure due to the clandestine filming 
and the pictures acquired as a result”.58 Notably, the extent to which he focuses on intrusion 
in Mosley has not gone unnoticed. In Jones, Sharpe JA identifies Mosley as an example of an 
intrusion tort, stating that it is one of a class of claims “that would easily fall within the 
intrusion upon seclusion category”.59 
 
Despite these pronouncements from the (English) Court of Appeal and the High Court, it is 
important to note that neither amounts to the domestic recognition of an intrusion upon 
seclusion-type privacy tort (of the sort found in the US, Canada or New Zealand). Assuming, 
arguendo, that Imerman is correct, misuse of private information is now actionable upon 
                                                          
56 [2011] EWHC 1326 (QB) at [23] (emphasis is original). CTB involved a famous Premier League footballer 
who sought an injunction to prevent disclosure in the media of the fact of an extra-marital affair in which he had 
engaged. 
57 Mosley, n.39, above, at [17]. The facts of Mosley are outlined at n.39, above. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Jones, n.4, above, at [62]. 
proof merely of the wrongful acquisition of private information. Yet some uncertainties 
remain regarding this. For example, it is unclear whether an unsuccessful attempt to acquire 
private information would also be actionable. Moreover, it becomes unclear just what is 
“wrong” about the wrongful act of acquiring private information; where is the tortious 
harm?60 Clearly these points require more academic and judicial work before they can be 
satisfactorily answered, but this of itself provides some evidence of the uncertainty now 
prevailing in this field. 
 
In any event, we can at least conclusively state that nothing in Imerman, Mosley or CTB has 
established a stand-alone cause of action focusing on the intrusive nature of the defendant’s 
conduct as the sole basis for liability. Misuse of private information retains at least one vital 
aspect of the equitable doctrine of confidence: it is based around informational rights. The 
intrusive nature of the defendant’s actions may be relevant, but only insofar as it sheds light 
on the extent of the harm which the claimant suffers. No English court has yet ruled that 
intrusion alone can found a tortious cause of action in privacy.61 
 
English law may then already contain a cause of action that is apt to guard against some 
(informational) intrusion-type privacy violations (as opposed to wrongful publication-type 
violations). But, crucially, English law has arrived at that state of affairs only by taking small, 
narrow steps to develop the common law on a case-by-case basis. By contrast, both Ontario 
and New Zealand may each be said to have taken much bigger steps.  
 
All three jurisdictions purport to have developed the doctrines on which we have dwelt on a 
merely “incremental” basis.62 Clearly, however, there are some differences in the concepts of 
“incrementalism” being espoused by these courts. Some clarity can be offered by making use 
of Dolding and Mullender’s notion of “narrow” and “wide” models of incrementalism.63 
They suggest that both models have found support from the English judiciary in the 20th 
century in various tort cases. Under a “narrow” model, courts regard themselves bound to 
apply existing doctrine rigidly and narrowly. This can preclude, for example, the adoption of 
novel categories of torts: novel claims must be fitted into the existing schema.64 By contrast, 
courts operating under a “wide” model are less “doctrine-bound”,65 and may work up novel 
heads of liability in order to give effect to the “protective purpose” underpinning tort law 
                                                          
60 In basing its decision on equitable principles, the Court of Appeal did not engage with the question of whether 
the mere acquisition of private information was sufficiently harmful to trigger liability in tort. However, given 
the uncertainty as to whether misuse of private information is equitable, tortious or falls within some other 
category yet to be identified, this (the Court of Appeal’s) has not provided a satisfactory answer. 
61 Though, of course, certain intrusive acts would be actionable per se under other causes of action such as the 
statutory torts under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, and common law assaults and trespasses. 
62 Jones, n.4, above, at [65] Holland, n.5, above, at [74-75] and [80]; Campbell, n.1, above, at [51]. 
63 Dolding and Mullender, n.10, above. 
64 Ibid at 16-17: “One way of expressing this difference between narrow and wide incrementalism is to note that 
while judges operating in the wide incrementalist mode look to presently existing doctrine for guidance as to the 
nature of the wrongful transactions comprehended by the law, they do not exhibit the degree of doctrine-
boundness manifested by judges engaged in the practice of narrow incrementalism.” 
65 Ibid at 17. 
generally.66 On the analysis offered in this paper, it can be said (at a level of generality) that 
whilst the English courts have preferred a “narrow” model of incremental development of 
privacy law in recent years, the Canadian and New Zealand courts, in Jones and Holland 
respectively, have adopted “wide” approaches.67 Both approaches are thus legitimately 
classifiable as “incremental” in nature, but clearly yield significantly different results. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In the English common law landscape, a particular mantra has become familiar: there is no 
tort of privacy.68 But because Article 8 ECHR cannot be ignored,69 the judiciary have found 
ways to protect some discrete aspects of privacy (in particular, informational privacy). They 
have done so by tinkering with the doctrine of confidence. In some respects, the tinkering 
looks quite substantial – almost to the point where the term “tinkering” might seem to fail to 
encapsulate depth of the exercise. For instance, a whole new (three-part) test for liability has 
been expounded. Also, the need for “circumstances importing an obligation of confidence” 
has been dispensed with. And information may now be significantly widespread within the 
public domain yet still be regarded as “private”.  
 
But it remains mere tinkering, for the aspect of privacy attracting protection is the same, and 
is still fairly narrow: private information. Thus the shoehorning of privacy interests into an 
ill-fitting doctrine that Phillips LJ bemoaned in Douglas is still very much the English way of 
doing things.70 Moreover, Imerman illustrates that this tinkering is ongoing: the tort of 
misuse of private information remains, therefore, in a state of flux. This is not particularly 
desirable, for it undermines legal certainty. England may thus be paying a high price for the 
ability to protect individuals from what is only a narrow range of purely informational 
privacy violations. 
 
By contrast, Canada and New Zealand have managed to advance the cause of privacy 
protection and legal certainty. They have advanced the cause of privacy protection by 
responding to gross intrusions upon the private lives of the two plaintiffs involved, and by 
fashioning a novel head of liability to provide redress. Moreover, the courts have ensured 
legal certainty by formulating torts which are unlikely to need further refinement – their 
elements are clear and unambiguous and draw on a well-established body of American case 
law.71 And in so doing, they have expressly shown sensitivity to the importance of freedom 
of expression, recognising novel privacy torts that are clear and set a fairly high bar for 
                                                          
66 Ibid at 14. 
67 For a more detailed analysis of the “wide” incrementalism present in the Jones case, see Bennett, n.4, above. 
68 See n.35, above, and accompanying text. 
69 Section 6(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998 requires courts, as public bodies, to act compatibly with 
Convention rights and, therefore, to act compatibly when elaborating the common law. For a recent analysis of 
this form of indirect horizontal effect, see G Phillipson and A Williams, “Horizontal Effect and the 
Constitutional Constraint” (2011) 74(6) MLR 878. 
70 Douglas, n.38, above, at [53]: “We cannot pretend that we find it satisfactory to be required to shoe-horn 
within the cause of action of breach of confidence claims for publication of unauthorised photographs of a 
private occasion.” 
71 See n.31, above, and accompanying text. 
plaintiffs to clear: the intrusion must be “highly offensive to a reasonable person” and, in 
New Zealand, relate to a “reasonable expectation of privacy”. 
 
The claim for justice (for the protection of privacy interests) may have been aided in the 
Jones and Holland cases by the deeply sympathetic nature of the plaintiffs. Both were wholly 
innocent parties whose privacy had been intruded upon in “shocking” and “disturb[ing]” 
ways.72 By contrast, the English cases in which misuse of private information has been 
slowly developing often involve “a particular type of claimant, generally a public figure or 
celebrity … who cannot be conveniently described as ‘vulnerable’”,73 or who might, in some 
way, be thought to be (at least partially) the architect of their own misfortune.74 This may go 
some way to explaining why the English judiciary in particular have inclined towards a more 
piecemeal approach to developing the law in privacy cases.  
 
The impetus for recognition of common law intrusion-type privacy torts comes from the 
confluence of several factors: an increased use of advances in technology to invade 
individuals’ privacy in novel ways (including the abuse of communications technology by the 
mass media, through telephone and email hacking, and the public outrage caused thereby), 
the reluctance of legislatures to create statutory privacy laws,75 and the appearance before 
courts of deeply sympathetic victims who have suffered outrageous intrusions upon their 
privacy.  
 
It is also significant that this most recent development (Holland) has taken place in New 
Zealand – a jurisdiction in which such large common law developments are relatively rare. 
Indeed, the jurisdiction’s approach for the last seven years has been broadly similar to 
England’s – guarding informational privacy interests against non-consensual publication. 
When formulating the wrongful publication privacy tort in Hosking,76 the New Zealand Court 
of Appeal stated that “the introduction of any high-level and wide tort of invasion of privacy” 
ought to be left to Parliament.77 Yet this apparently did not preclude the High Court from 
recognising a discrete, novel head of tortious liability. 
 
In Holland, Whata J noted that “[a]cceptance [of an intrusion tort] in some parts of North 
America is not an international trend”.78 But, given the outcome of the case, it might quite 
readily be said that – in the light of Jones and its reasoning subsequently being adopted half 
the world away – there is now growing evidence of an “international trend” worthy of 
significantly greater academic and judicial attention.  
 
                                                          
72 Jones, n.4, above, at [69]. 
73 P O’Callaghan, “Monologism and Dialogism in Private Law” (2010) 7 J Juris 405 at 432. 
74 See, for example, Mosley, Campbell and CTB, above; also Terry (formerly LNS) v Persons Unknown [2010] 
EWHC 119 (QB); [2010] EMLR 16. 
75 The reluctance to engage in legislative reform of privacy laws may be due, at least in part, to the political 
pressure placed on governments by the press, as has been seen particularly in England in the aftermath of Lord 
Leveson’s report into the ‘Culture, Practice and Ethics of the Press’. 
76 Hosking, n.2, above. 
77 Holland, n.5, above, at [110]. 
78 Ibid at [87]. 
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